ah... dude, whats the problem? Maybe you should get a Mac.
* Forwarded message:
* >From bquigley@iyar.rutgers.edu Wed Apr 16 13:54:43 1997
* Date: Wed, 16 Apr 1997 12:31:19 -0400
* From: Barbara Quigley <bquigley@iyar.rutgers.edu>
* Message-Id: <199704161631.MAA24651@iyar.rutgers.edu>
* To: dimacs-rustaff@iyar.rutgers.edu, dimacs-rupustaff@iyar.rutgers.edu,
* local-list@iyar.rutgers.edu, rutgers-list@iyar.rutgers.edu,
* dimacs-members@iyar.rutgers.edu, sy-net@iyar.rutgers.edu,
* massive-list@iyar.rutgers.edu, dimacs-outside@iyar.rutgers.edu,
* dimacs-current-visitors@iyar.rutgers.edu,
* dimacs-current-postdocs-univ@iyar.rutgers.edu,
* dimacs-current-postdocs-industry@iyar.rutgers.edu
* Subject: Program for DIMACS Workshop on Economics, Game Theory, and the
*Internet, April 18-19, 1997
*
* Schedule for the Workshop on Economics, Game Theory, and the Internet
*
* Friday, April 18th
*
* 8:15-9:00 A.M. Breakfast at DIMACS
*
* 9:00-9:05 A.M. Welcome to DIMACS, Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director
*
* 9:05-10:15 A.M. Herve Moulin, (Duke University)
* Fair division under network externalities
*
* 10:30-11:45 A.M. Bill Sharkey, (Federal Communications Commission)
* Economic Theory and Telecommunications Policy
* after the Telecommunications Act of 1996
*
* 11:45-1:00 P.M. Lunch at DIMACS
*
* 1:00-2:30 P.M. Ken Binmore, (University College London)
* Applying game theory to automated negotiation
*
* Dean Foster, (Penn)
* Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
*
* Eric Friedman, (Rutgers)
* Learning and implementation on the Internet
*
* 2:30-3:00 P.M. Catherine Eckel, (National Science Foundation)
* New NSF Initiatives
*
* 3:30-5:30 P.M. Alok Gupta, (Connecticut)
* Designing Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Internet
* Traffic Pricing
*
* Yannis Korilis, (Lucent Technologies)
* Pricing Noncooperative Networks
*
* Nemo Semret, (Columbia)
* The Dynamics of an Auction for Network Resource Sharing
*
* Dale Stahl, (Texas-Austin)
* The inefficiency of auctions in dynamic stochastic
* environments
*
* 6:00-7:00 P.M. Reception at the Rutgers Economics Department,
* 3rd floor, New Jersey Hall.
*
* Saturday, April 19th
*
* 8:15-9:00 A.M. Breakfast at DIMACS
*
* 9:00-10:15 A.M. Hal Varian, (U.C. Berkeley)
* Intellectual property rights in a digital environment
*
* 10:30-11:45 A.M. Scott Shenker, (Xerox PARC)
* Everything you always wanted to know but were afraid to
* ask about Economics, Game Theory and the Internet:
* A Survey and Q&A session.
*
* 11:45-1:00 P.M. Lunch at DIMACS
*
* 1:00-2:30 P.M. Yannis Bakos, (U.C. Irvine)
* Bundling Information Goods: Pricing Profits and Efficiency
*
* Bernardo Huberman, (Xerox PARC)
* Social Dilemmas and Internet Latencies
*
* Yoav Shoham, (Stanford)
* On the role of incentives in network-based applications
*
* 2:45 -4:15 P.M. Beth Allen, (Minnesota)
* The economics of scientific data
*
* Indrajit Ray, (York)
* A simple model of slot allocation
*
* Timothy VanZandt, (Princeton)
* Information overload in a network of targeted communication
*
* 4:30 -6:00 P.M. Van Kolpin, (Oregon)
* Equitable pricing of directed use networks
*
* Deborah Minehart, (Boston U.)
* Link patterns in buyer-supplier networks:
* incentives and efficiency in graphs
*
* Anne Van de Nouveland, (Oregon)
* A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
*
*
*
-
Time exists so everything doesn't happen at once,
Space exists so everything doesn't happen to you.
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