> Perhaps there should be a commandment regarding empty forwarded
> messages? :-)
I'm confused; does the same email not go to everyone? I got the
following, which isn't an empty forwarded message at all...
> From khare@anansi.w3.org Wed Apr 16 11:01:46 1997
> Subject: Program for DIMACS Workshop on Economics, Game Theory, and the Internet, April 18-19, 1997 (fwd)
> To: FoRK@xent.w3.org (FoRK)
>
> Forwarded message:
> >From bquigley@iyar.rutgers.edu Wed Apr 16 13:54:43 1997
> Date: Wed, 16 Apr 1997 12:31:19 -0400
>
> Schedule for the Workshop on Economics, Game Theory, and the Internet
>
> Friday, April 18th
>
> 8:15-9:00 A.M. Breakfast at DIMACS
>
> 9:00-9:05 A.M. Welcome to DIMACS, Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director
>
> 9:05-10:15 A.M. Herve Moulin, (Duke University)
> Fair division under network externalities
>
> 10:30-11:45 A.M. Bill Sharkey, (Federal Communications Commission)
> Economic Theory and Telecommunications Policy
> after the Telecommunications Act of 1996
>
> 11:45-1:00 P.M. Lunch at DIMACS
>
> 1:00-2:30 P.M. Ken Binmore, (University College London)
> Applying game theory to automated negotiation
>
> Dean Foster, (Penn)
> Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
>
> Eric Friedman, (Rutgers)
> Learning and implementation on the Internet
>
> 2:30-3:00 P.M. Catherine Eckel, (National Science Foundation)
> New NSF Initiatives
>
> 3:30-5:30 P.M. Alok Gupta, (Connecticut)
> Designing Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Internet
> Traffic Pricing
>
> Yannis Korilis, (Lucent Technologies)
> Pricing Noncooperative Networks
>
> Nemo Semret, (Columbia)
> The Dynamics of an Auction for Network Resource Sharing
>
> Dale Stahl, (Texas-Austin)
> The inefficiency of auctions in dynamic stochastic
> environments
>
> 6:00-7:00 P.M. Reception at the Rutgers Economics Department,
> 3rd floor, New Jersey Hall.
>
> Saturday, April 19th
>
> 8:15-9:00 A.M. Breakfast at DIMACS
>
> 9:00-10:15 A.M. Hal Varian, (U.C. Berkeley)
> Intellectual property rights in a digital environment
>
> 10:30-11:45 A.M. Scott Shenker, (Xerox PARC)
> Everything you always wanted to know but were afraid to
> ask about Economics, Game Theory and the Internet:
> A Survey and Q&A session.
>
> 11:45-1:00 P.M. Lunch at DIMACS
>
> 1:00-2:30 P.M. Yannis Bakos, (U.C. Irvine)
> Bundling Information Goods: Pricing Profits and Efficiency
>
> Bernardo Huberman, (Xerox PARC)
> Social Dilemmas and Internet Latencies
>
> Yoav Shoham, (Stanford)
> On the role of incentives in network-based applications
>
> 2:45 -4:15 P.M. Beth Allen, (Minnesota)
> The economics of scientific data
>
> Indrajit Ray, (York)
> A simple model of slot allocation
>
> Timothy VanZandt, (Princeton)
> Information overload in a network of targeted communication
>
> 4:30 -6:00 P.M. Van Kolpin, (Oregon)
> Equitable pricing of directed use networks
>
> Deborah Minehart, (Boston U.)
> Link patterns in buyer-supplier networks:
> incentives and efficiency in graphs
>
> Anne Van de Nouveland, (Oregon)
> A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
----
adam@cs.caltech.edu
I've been your sister, I've been your mistress;
who could ask me for more?
-- the Cardigans