[FoRK] [Fwd: CIA: Osama Helped Bush in '04]

Damien Morton < fork at bitfurnace.com > on > Wed Jul 5 08:01:30 PDT 2006

http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/070306.html

This stunning CIA disclosure is tucked away in a brief passage near the 
end of Ron Suskind’s /The One Percent Doctrine/, which draws heavily 
from CIA insiders. Suskind wrote that the CIA analysts based their 
troubling assessment on classified information, but the analysts still 
puzzled over exactly why bin-Laden wanted Bush to stay in office.

According to Suskind’s book, CIA analysts had spent years “parsing each 
expressed word of the al-Qaeda leader and his deputy, [Ayman] Zawahiri. 
What they’d learned over nearly a decade is that bin-Laden speaks only 
for strategic reasons. …

“Their [the CIA’s] assessments, at day’s end, are a distillate of the 
kind of secret, internal conversations that the American public [was] 
not sanctioned to hear: strategic analysis. Today’s conclusion: 
bin-Laden’s message was clearly designed to assist the President’s 
reelection.

“At the five o’clock meeting, [deputy CIA director] John McLaughlin 
opened the issue with the consensus view: ‘Bin-Laden certainly did a 
nice favor today for the President.’”

McLaughlin’s comment drew nods from CIA officers at the table. Jami 
Miscik, CIA deputy associate director for intelligence, suggested that 
the al-Qaeda founder may have come to Bush’s aid because bin-Laden felt 
threatened by the rise in Iraq of Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi; bin-Laden might have thought his leadership would be 
diminished if Bush lost the White House and their “eye-to-eye struggle” 
ended.

But the CIA analysts also felt that bin-Laden might have recognized how 
Bush’s policies – including the Guantanamo prison camp, the Abu Ghraib 
scandal and the endless bloodshed in Iraq – were serving al-Qaeda’s 
strategic goals for recruiting a new generation of jihadists.

“Certainly,” the CIA’s Miscik said, “he would want Bush to keep doing 
what he’s doing for a few more years,” according to Suskind’s account of 
the meeting.

As their internal assessment sank in, the CIA analysts drifted into 
silence, troubled by the implications of their own conclusions. “An 
ocean of hard truths before them – such as what did it say about U.S. 
policies that bin-Laden would want Bush reelected – remained untouched,” 
Suskind wrote.




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