The order is not exactly what I would have it as, but the points make
crystal clear sense for those of us in the infonautics field/.
http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/97unclas/axioms.html
-----
Believe in your own professional judgments.
Be aggressive, and do not fear being wrong.
It is better to be mistaken than to be wrong.
Avoid mirror imaging at all costs.
Intelligence is of no value if it is not disseminated.
Coordination is necessary, but do not settle for the least common
denominator.
When everyone agrees on an issue, something probably is wrong.
The consumer does not care how much you know, just tell him what is
important.
Form is never more important than substance.
Aggressively pursue collection of information you need.
Do not take the editing process too seriously.
Know your Community counterparts and talk to them frequently.
Never let your career take precedence over your job.
Being an intelligence analyst is not a popularity contest.
Do not take your job-or yourself-too seriously.
-----------
How To Succeed in the DI
Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts
Frank Watanabe
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recently, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) has seen a spate of "new
thinking" on its mission and on how it conducts that mission. Notable
examples are the mandatory Tradecraft 2000 course and the publication of a
paper entitled "Intelligence Changes in Analytic Tradecraft in CIA's
Directorate of Intelligence." (1) As well-meaning and insightful as all
this new thinking is, however, most is coming from senior DI managers, not
from the analysts and other junior and midlevel officers who carry out the
DI's mission on a daily basis. In addition, some frontline DI
officers--myself included--would take exception to the idea that the
concepts put forth in Tradecraft 2000 truly represent new thinking. Much
of it is merely a return to the basics of DI tradecraft that many of us in
the Directorate seem to have forgotten.
Before leaving the DI on a rotational assignment, I endeavored to set down
some of the axioms by which I have tried to live in my career. Initially,
this exercise was begun to provide some practical advice to a new analyst
joining my branch, but I eventually decided that these axioms might be of
interest to officers throughout the DI. Although I have not rigidly
adhered to them, they have served me well as general guides to
professional conduct as a DI analyst. To experienced analysts, many of the
principles will sound like truisms and, if that is the case, all the
better. I just tried to codify general rules that guide what we in the DI
do on a daily basis, and I would not presume to invent new tradecraft. But
the new DI analyst, and more than a few old hands, would be well served by
remembering these 15 principles in their everyday conduct, as I suspect
that many will never be adopted officially.
Believe in your own professional judgments. Always be willing to listen to
alternative conclusions or other points of view, but stand your ground if
you really believe the intelligence supports a certain conclusion. Just
because someone is your boss, is a higher grade, or has been around longer
than you does not mean he or she knows more about your account than you
do. You are the one who reads the traffic every day and who studies the
issue.
Be aggressive, and do not fear being wrong. Anyone can restate what a raw
intelligence report said, but in the DI we are supposed to be in the
analysis business. As a DI officer, it is your job to go beyond the
facts--in a rigorous, logical way--to understand what they mean. Do not be
afraid to predict the future, or of being wrong. If you are right most of
the time, you are doing pretty well. But if you are always right, then you
are not doing your job.
It is better to be mistaken than to be wrong. One of the hardest things to
do is to admit that your original assessment was mistaken. Too many people
in the DI refuse to admit a mistake or an incorrect assessment and to
change their assessments in light of new facts. But it is always better to
admit you were wrong and to change a position when the facts warrant it
than to stand by an incorrect assessment in the face of new facts. For
example, earlier in my career, I was responsible for evaluating foreign
export control systems to determine if they could protect sensitive
Western technology. I was convinced that one of the countries I was
studying was not able to protect sensitive technologies because of
weaknesses in its control system, and I had written my intelligence
assessments accordingly. Later, I had the opportunity to go to the country
and see firsthand the system in operation. I was surprised to find that it
was far more secure than I had believed, and I reversed my earlier
assessments of its unreliability. Had I stuck to my original analysis, I
would have been wrong.
Avoid mirror imaging at all costs. Mirror imaging--projecting your thought
process or value system onto someone else--is one of the greatest threats
to objective intelligence analysis. Not everyone is alike, and cultural,
ethnic, religious, and political differences do matter. Just because
something seems like the logical conclusion or course of action to you
does not mean that the person or group you are analyzing will see it that
way, particularly when differences in values and thought processes come
into play. For instance, in the days before Iraq invaded Kuwait, the
conventional wisdom was that Iraq would not invade, and that its hostile
military actions were intended to intimidate Kuwait and Saudi Arabia into
abiding by OPEC production quotas, thereby driving up the price of oil.
The argument made perfectly good sense to Westerners, while invasion
seemed illogical. But Saddam Hussein did not view the situation precisely
as many analysts did.
Intelligence is of no value if it is not disseminated. It does not matter
how much you know about a subject unless you clearly and effectively
communicate the intelligence and your assessment to the consumer in a
timely manner. We cannot support policymakers if we do not provide them
with the intelligence. The US Navy had SIGINT providing advance warning of
Japanese plans to bomb Pearl Harbor, but it did not analyze the
information and disseminate it to the proper officials in time to prevent
the attack.
Coordination is necessary, but do not settle for the least common
denominator. We coordinate to ensure a corporate product and to bring the
substantive expertise of others to bear. But, as one commentator once
said, "Consensus is valuable, indeed essential, for moving the ship of
state in a reasonable, orderly way. But widespread agreement and shared
assumptions do not mean the agreements and assumptions are correct." True
analytic differences of opinion do occur. If you think you are right, and
the coordinator disagrees, let the assessment reflect that difference of
opinion and use a footnote if necessary. But never water down your
assessment to a lowest common denominator just to obtain coordination.
When everyone agrees on an issue, something probably is wrong. It is rare
when everyone in the Intelligence Community agrees on an analytic
judgment. When these instances do occur, it is time to worry. Maybe it is
because all of you are all right. But it may also be because you have
fallen into a group-think mentality that does not allow you to see the
other side. As an example, following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
there was an almost unanimous belief that large numbers of Russian
ballistic missile specialists would flood into the Third World and aid
missile programs in other states (the so-called brain drain). The
unanimity on this issue obstructed a thoughtful debate on the probability
of such an exodus occurring and of alternative scenarios. As it turned
out, there was no mass departure of Russian missile specialists, but
Russian expertise was supplied to other states in ways that had been
ignored due to the overemphasis on the brain drain. Differences of opinion
are healthy because they force both sides to make their case on the field
of intellectual battle.
The consumer does not care how much you know, just tell him what is
important. Too many analysts strive to demonstrate their depth of
knowledge and sophistication in their products by loading them with facts
and details. But the consumer of intelligence does not care how much you
know. He wants you to tell him only those things that are really important
for him to know and what they mean. Superfluous details merely serve to
obscure the important facts.
Form is never more important than substance. In the DI, we spend a lot of
time worrying about the form in which our analysis is disseminated. But
the consumer wants to know what the intelligence says, and he wants to
know it when he needs to know it. Most consumers do not care how
attractive a report looks or whether the format iscorrect. I have lost
count of the number of times consumers have told me they do not care if an
assessment has a CIA seal on it, if it is in the proper format, or even if
it has draft stamped all over it; they just want the assessment in their
hands as soon as possible, at least in time to help make a decision. This
is not an excuse for sloppy or shoddy work, or for bypassing the review
process, but do not let concerns over the form of your product get in the
way of the substance of what you are trying to communicate and its
timeliness.
Aggressively pursue collection of information you need. In the
Intelligence Community, we have the unique ability to bring substantial
collection resources to bear in order to collect information on important
issues. But too many analysts in the DI sit in front of their screens and
passively wait for the information they need for their jobs to come to
them. If you are examining a problem and there is no intelligence
available, or the available intelligence is insufficient, be aggressive in
pursuing collection and in energizing collectors. During my career, I
played a central role in reorienting collection toward new, rest-of-world
targets to meet new consumer requirements following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. My investment in time and energy did not expand my
production file, but it did result in valuable new intelligence that
allowed me and others in the Community to answer the customers' questions.
As an analyst, you have the advantage of knowing both what the consumer
needs to know (sometimes better than the consumer knows himself) and which
collectors can obtain the needed intelligence. If you are not frequently
tasking collectors and giving them feedback on their reporting, you are
failing to do an important part of your job.
Do not take the editing process too seriously. If editorial changes do not
alter the meaning of what you are trying to say, accept them graciously.
When the changes do alter the meaning, however, do not be afraid to speak
up and contest the changes.
Know your Community counterparts and talk to them frequently. The CIA does
not have a monopoly on either the truth or on all information. So get to
know your counterparts in the various Intelligence Community agencies-both
analysts and collectors-and talk to them frequently, finding out what they
are doing and informing them of what you are doing. "Frequently" means
several times a month, not just when you need something. If you cannot
recognize their voices over the phone, then you probably are not talking
to them often enough. My close ties to counterparts at NSA and DIA-and the
resulting collaboration-have repeatedly resulted in better collection,
better products, less duplication, and less conflict over coordination.
Never let your career take precedence over your job. As a professional
intelligence officer, your responsibility is to present the best
intelligence analysis possible, given the available information. Sometimes
this requires taking positions or doing things that may make you unpopular
with colleagues or supervisors. But never let your legitimate concerns for
your career take precedence over your obligation to do your job.
Being an intelligence analyst is not a popularity contest. Some of your
assessments may be unpopular or unwanted, particularly by policymakers who
do not want to see intelligence that undercuts their objectives. You also
may not make many friends in the coordination process. But your job is to
pursue the truth. I recall a colleague who forwarded an analysis that
called into question the wisdom behind several new US weapon systems. This
analysis caused criticism of the CIA, of his office, and of himself. He
stood his ground, however; the Agency supported him, and eventually he was
proved right. He did not make a lot of friends, but he did his job.
Do not take your job-or yourself-too seriously. The fate of the world does
not rest on your shoulders. Also, there will always be more work than
there is time to do it. You have to keep things in perspective. Do not
become a workaholic; remember to take care of yourself and your family.
You are doing a job, not conducting a crusade.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTES
(1) Jack Davis, "Intelligence Changes in Analytic Tradecraft in CIA's
Directorate of Intelligence" (CIAPES ICATCIADI-9504), April 1995
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